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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Roseann Zirnsak brings this action to appeal 
the final decision of the District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, dated December 5, 2013, affirming 
the denial of her claim for Social Security Disability Income 
benefits. Zirnsak v. Colvin, No. 2:13cv303, 2013 WL 
6622925 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2013). For the reasons that follow 
we will affirm the decision of the District Court. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
 In October of 2001, Ms. Roseann Zirnsak (“Zirnsak” 
or “the claimant”) was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 
which she sustained head and lung injuries and skeletal 
fractures. Zirnsak v. Colvin, No. 2:13cv303, 2013 WL 
6622925, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2013). She was hospitalized 
following that incident from October 8, 2001 through 
November 14, 2001. Id. While hospitalized, she was 
temporarily on life support. Id. Upon her discharge, she was 
sent to a rehabilitation facility. Id. Four days after entering the 
rehabilitation facility, she returned to the hospital for a 
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procedure to have her gangrenous gallbladder removed. Id. 
After her discharge following that procedure, she again 
returned to the rehabilitation facility. Id. Zirnsak continued to 
be treated at a rehabilitation facility from January 16, 2002 
through October 18, 2005. Id. In February of 2003, she 
suffered a seizure and sought treatment immediately 
thereafter. Id. She was prescribed medication, and she did not 
suffer any further seizures. Id. Between January 5, 2005 and 
August 11, 2006, Zirnsak underwent plastic surgery 
treatments for lipoma reductions. Id. at *4.  
 
 In the years following her accident, Zirnsak sought 
treatment from several medical professionals. Zirnsak 
received the following treatment relevant to her mental 
condition. Zirnsak was treated by Dr. Thomas Franz, M.D., 
from February 22, 2003 through February 3, 2010. Id. Dr. 
Franz treated Zirnsak for “traumatic brain injury, left 
hemiparesis cognitive impairments with short-term memory 
deficits, organic affective changes[,] and a seizure disorder.” 
Id. Dr. Kevin Kelly, M.D., Ph.D., treated Zirnsak from 
February 14, 2003 through February 4, 2010. Id. He 
diagnosed Zirnsak with a seizure disorder. Id. Dr. David 
Newman, Ph.D., evaluated Zirnsak over a three-day period—
from April 4–6, 2010. Id. His report summarizing that 
evaluation noted “a suggestion of mild short-term memory 
loss and a concentration deficit.” Id. Finally, on April 8, 2010, 
Michelle Santilli, Psy. D., performed a mental residual 
functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment of Zirnsak. Id. She 
concluded that Zirnsak could perform competitive work on a 
sustained basis. Id. 
 
 On January 6, 2010, Zirnsak applied for Social 
Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits alleging a 
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disability commencing on May 11, 2006. Id. at *1. 1  The 
parties agree that Zirnsak’s date last insured was December 
31, 2007. (Transcript (“Tr.”) at 32). 2  Accordingly, the 
relevant period for Zirnsak’s disability determination is the 
period from May 11, 2006 to December 31, 2007. The Social 
Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Zirnsak’s application 
on May 17, 2010. (Id.). On June 14, 2010, Zirnsak requested 
a hearing, which was subsequently held on June 22, 2011. 
(Id.). At the hearing, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 
James P. Pileggi heard testimony from Zirnsak, her husband, 
and a vocational expert. (Id. at 30–59). On July 15, 2011, ALJ 
Pileggi issued a decision denying Zirnsak’s application for 
benefits. Zirnsak, 2013 WL 6622925, at *1. He found that 
Zirnsak was “not under a disability, as defined in the Social 
Security Act, at any time from May 11, 2006, the amended 
alleged onset date, through December 31, 2007, the date last 
insured.” (Tr. at 22). As part of that finding, ALJ Pileggi 
found that Zirnsak was capable of performing certain jobs 
available in the national economy, so long as those jobs were 
sedentary and routine. (Id. at 16). He based that finding, in 
part, on testimony from a vocational expert who opined that 
Zirnsak was capable of working as an order clerk (food and 
                                              
1 Zirnsak’s initial application asserted a disability onset 
date of October 8, 2001. Zirnsak, 2013 WL 6622925, at *1. 
However, at the June 22, 2011 hearing, the parties agreed to 
amend the onset of disability date to May 11, 2006. 
(Transcript at 31–32). May 11, 2006 is the day immediately 
following the date on which a prior application for SSDI 
benefits for Zirnsak was denied. (Id. at 32). 
2 “Tr. at _” refers to the administrative transcript filed 
in this case on February 27, 2014. 
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beverage), charge account clerk, telephone clerk, or sedentary 
subassembler. (Id. at 21–22). 
 
 That decision became final on January 9, 2013, when, 
after reconsideration, the Appeals Council affirmed the prior 
determination. Zirnsak, 2013 WL 6622925, at *1. On March 
1, 2013, Zirnsak filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
405(g) seeking review of the Commissioner’s final 
determination. Id. On August 12, 2013, United States 
Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell filed a Report and 
Recommendation indicating that the decision of the 
Commissioner should be affirmed. Id. On December 3, 2013, 
United States District Judge David Stewart Cercone filed an 
Order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation as the opinion of the district court, 
affirming the denial of Zirnsak’s claim for SSDI benefits, and 
entering judgment for the Commissioner. Id. Zirnsak timely 
filed this appeal on January 21, 2014. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION3 
 1.  Standard of Review  
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction to review a final 
administrative decision by the Social Security Commissioner 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction to 
review the District Court’s December 3, 2013 Order denying 
Zirnsak’s motion for summary judgment and granting the 
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
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 This Court reviews any findings of fact made by an 
ALJ under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard. 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g); Schaudeck v. Comm’r, 181 F.3d 429, 431 
(3d Cir. 1999). We must affirm the ALJ so long as his 
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. Craigie v. 
Bowen, 835 F.2d 56, 57 (3d Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence 
is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 
399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). It is “more than a mere 
scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of 
the evidence.” Id. We review the record as a whole to 
determine whether substantial evidence supports a factual 
finding. Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431. When performing that 
review, we are mindful that we must not substitute our own 
judgment for that of the fact finder. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 
552. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
determination of legal issues. Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431. 
 
2.  The Administrative Law Judge’s Assessment of 
Zirnsak’s Mental Residual Functioning 
Capacity   
 The core issue in this case is whether Zirnsak was 
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any 
point during the period from May 11, 2006 through 
December 31, 2007. Section 423(d)(1)(A) of the Social 
Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in 
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual is disabled 
if her impairments are severe enough that not only is she 
 8 
 
incapable of performing her previous work, but she is also 
incapable of engaging in “any other kind of substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 
423(d)(2)(A). It is the claimant’s burden to establish that she 
is disabled. See id. § 432(d)(5)(A) (“An individual shall not 
be considered to be under a disability unless [s]he furnishes 
such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as 
the Commissioner of Social Security may require.”). The 
claimant must also establish that the onset date of disability 
occurred prior to the expiration of the claimant’s insured 
status. 20 C.F.R. § 404.131 (2014). 
 
 A five-step, sequential evaluation process is employed 
to determine whether a particular claimant has met the burden 
of establishing disability. Id. § 404.1520(a). The five-step 
inquiry proceeds as follows. First, the Commissioner 
considers whether the claimant is “engaging in substantial 
gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If yes, then the 
claimant is not disabled. Id. Second, the Commissioner 
considers the severity of the claimant’s impairment(s). Id. § 
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant’s impairment(s) are either 
not severe or do not meet the duration requirement, the 
claimant is not disabled. Id. Third, the Commissioner 
considers whether the claimant’s impairment(s) meet or equal 
the requirements of one of the Commissioner’s listed 
impairments. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s 
impairment(s) meet the requirements of a listed impairment, 
then the claimant is disabled. Id. 
 
 If not, then the inquiry proceeds to the fourth step, 
where the Commissioner considers whether the claimant can 
return to her past work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To 
determine whether the claimant can perform her past work, 
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the Commissioner assesses the claimant’s residual functional 
capacity (“RFC”). Id. § 404.1520(e). A claimant’s RFC 
measures “the most [she] can do despite [her] limitations.” Id. 
§ 404.1545(a)(1). The Commissioner examines “all of the 
relevant medical and other evidence” to make its RFC 
determination. Id. § 404.1545(a)(3). If the Commissioner 
finds that the claimant can still perform her past work, she is 
not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). It is important to note 
that during steps two through four of the inquiry, the claimant 
always bears the burden of establishing (1) that she is 
severely impaired, and (2) either that the severe impairment 
meets or equals a listed impairment, or that it prevents her 
from performing her past work. Wallace v. Sec’y of Health & 
Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983).  
 
 If the claimant meets those burdens by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then the inquiry proceeds to 
step five, where the Commissioner bears the burden of 
establishing the existence of other available work that the 
claimant is capable of performing. 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) (2014); Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 
777 (3d Cir. 1987). To meet this burden, the Commissioner 
must produce evidence that establishes that “work exists in 
significant numbers in the national economy that [the 
claimant] can do.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560. The Commissioner 
uses the RFC assessment, Id. at § 404.1520(e), and the 
testimony of vocational experts and specialists, Id. § 
404.1566(e); 416.966(e), to make this determination. 
“Ultimately, entitlement to benefits is dependent upon finding 
the claimant is incapable of performing work in the national 
economy.” Provenzano v. Comm’r, Civil No. 10–4460 (JBS), 
2011 WL 3859917, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2011). 
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 Zirnsak’s first argument on appeal is that the ALJ’s 
assessment of her mental RFC is not supported by substantial 
evidence. Specifically, Zirnsak argues that the ALJ erred in 
(1) rejecting evidence from certain lay witnesses and (2) 
according “little weight” to the opinion of Dr. Newman, the 
doctor who evaluated Zirnsak on April 4–6, 2010. 
(Appellant’s Brief (“Br.”) at 24–25). Zirnsak contends that 
both categories of testimony provide objective evidence of a 
memory impairment that was not accounted for in the ALJ’s 
RFC finding, and that therefore the ALJ should have afforded 
them more weight. (Id. at 26).  
 
  A. Lay Testimony 
 It is the claimant’s burden to establish that she became 
disabled at some point between the onset date of disability 
and the date that her insured status expired. In Zirnsak’s case, 
this period ranges from May 11, 2006 through December 31, 
2007. As part of the five-step disability inquiry, an ALJ can 
consider evidence from non-medical sources to determine the 
severity of a claimant’s impairments and how those 
impairments impact the claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1513(d) (2014). Non-medical sources include “spouses, 
parents and other caregivers, siblings, other relatives, friends, 
neighbors, and clergy.” Id. § 404.1513(d)(4). The 
Commissioner has issued a policy interpretation ruling “to 
clarify how [to] consider opinions from sources who are not 
‘acceptable medical sources.’” SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 
2329939, at *1 (Aug. 9, 2006). This ruling states that ALJs 
should consider “such factors as the nature and extent of the 
relationship, whether the evidence is consistent with other 
evidence, and any other factors that tend to support or refute 
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the evidence” when evaluating evidence from non-medical 
sources such as family or friends. Id.  
 
 To properly evaluate these factors, the ALJ must 
necessarily make certain credibility determinations, and this 
Court defers to the ALJ’s assessment of credibility. See Diaz 
v. Comm’r, 577 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In 
determining whether there is substantial evidence to support 
an administrative law judge’s decision, we owe deference to 
his evaluation of the evidence [and] assessment of the 
credibility of witnesses . . . .”). However, the ALJ must 
specifically identify and explain what evidence he found not 
credible and why he found it not credible. Adorno v. Shalala, 
40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Stewart v. Sec’y of 
Health, Education and Welfare, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 
1983)); see also Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (stating that an ALJ is required to provide “specific 
reasons for rejecting lay testimony”). An ALJ cannot reject 
evidence for an incorrect or unsupported reason. Ray v. 
Astrue, 649 F. Supp. 2d 391, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting 
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 
 In 2011, several members of Zirnsak’s family and 
friends submitted letters to the ALJ on her behalf. (Tr. at 19). 
Each letter stated that Zirnsak “suffer[ed] from substantial 
difficulties.” (Id.). The ALJ found that these letters were only 
“partially credible” and therefore accorded them “little 
weight.” (Id. at 20). The ALJ specifically referenced the three 
SSR 06-3p factors in explaining this decision. (Id.). First, the 
ALJ acknowledged that Zirnsak’s friends and family each 
clearly had an established relationship with her. (Id.). Second, 
he explained that the letters’ references to Zirnsak’s 
significant limitations were inconsistent with her limited 
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medical treatment during the relevant period. (Id.). Finally, 
the ALJ noted that the letters did not directly address 
Zirnsak’s condition during the relevant period—from May 
11, 2006 through December 31, 2007. (Id.). The ALJ used the 
same process to evaluate the testimony of the claimant’s 
husband, Donald Zirnsak. (Id.). The ALJ noted that Donald 
Zirnsak and the claimant had an established relationship. 
(Id.). However, the ALJ ultimately found Donald’s testimony 
not credible because of its inconsistencies with Zirnsak’s 
limited treatment and her reported activities of daily living. 
(Id.). 
 
 In evaluating the lay testimony of Zirnsak’s family, 
friends, and husband, the ALJ explicitly followed the 
guidance set forth in SSR 06-03p. He evaluated the relevant 
factors, assessed the credibility of certain evidence, and 
explained why he found certain evidence to be not credible. 
Ray, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 402. His reasons for rejecting the 
evidence are supported by substantial evidence, as the 
evidence did not relate to the narrow question presented to the 
ALJ: whether Zirnsak was disabled at any point between May 
11, 2006 and December 31, 2007. We therefore defer to the 
ALJ’s credibility assessments. Diaz, 577 F.3d at 506. 
  
 In her brief, Zirnsak argues that two Social Security 
Rulings and a series of other cases compel a contrary result. 
(Appellant’s Br. at 30–32, 43). This reliance is misplaced. 
First, the two Social Security Rulings relied on by Zirnsak are 
not designed to provide guidance for how to evaluate lay 
opinion testimony. The purpose of the first ruling cited, SSR 
83-20, is to “describe the relevant evidence to be considered 
when establishing the onset date of disability,” not whether 
disability exists. SSR 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at *1 (1983) 
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(emphasis added). The second ruling cited by Zirnsak, SSR 
96-7p, lists its purpose as “to clarify when the evaluation of 
symptoms, including pain, . . . requires a finding about the 
credibility of an individual [claimant’s] statements.” SSR 96-
7p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996). Therefore, SSR 96-7p 
does not address lay witnesses’ accounts of the claimant’s 
symptoms, but rather the claimant’s description of her own 
pain. Id. Accordingly, the claimant’s arguments based upon 
these rulings and certain cases interpreting those rulings are 
inapposite. Therefore, the record is insufficient to establish 
that the ALJ erred in according little weight to the testimony 
of Zirnsak’s friends and husband. 
  
  B. Dr. Newman’s Testimony  
 Zirnsak also argues that the ALJ erred in according the 
opinion of Dr. Newman, the consultative psychologist who 
examined Zirnsak in 2010, little weight. (Appellant’s Br. at 
46). Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.131, a claimant is required to 
prove that she became disabled prior to the expiration of her 
insured status. 20 C.F.R. § 404.131 (2014); Matullo v. Bowen, 
926 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1990). Here, the parties do not 
dispute that Zirnsak’s insured status expired on December 31, 
2007. To determine whether a claimant became disabled prior 
to the expiration of her insured status, the ALJ must consider 
all relevant evidence, including medical evidence, in the 
record. Adorno, 40 F.3d at 48 (citing Stewart, 714 F.2d at 
290). However, the ALJ is free to accept some medical 
evidence and reject other evidence, provided that he provides 
an explanation for discrediting the rejected evidence. Id.; see 
also Stout, 454 F.3d at 1054 (emphasizing that it is the role of 
the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to articulate specific 
reasons for rejecting evidence). 
 14 
 
 
 Here, the ALJ did articulate a specific reason for 
giving Dr. Newman’s evaluation little weight—“because it 
was completed considerably outside of the relevant period.” 
(Tr. at 18). We must therefore evaluate whether substantial 
evidence supports that determination. We find that it does. As 
stated many times in this opinion, the inquiry in this case is 
limited to the narrow question of whether Zirnsak was 
disabled within the meaning of Section 423(d)(1)(A) of the 
Social Security Act during the period of May 11, 2006 
through December 31, 2007. Dr. Newman’s examination was 
conducted on April 6, 2010, over two years after the 
expiration of Zirnsak’s insured status. (Tr. at 884). At no 
point does the report assert that it is a retroactive evaluation 
of Zirnsak’s condition. (Id. at 884–87). The report refers to 
Zirnsak’s “current complaint[s].” (Id. at 884 (emphasis 
added)). It provides a summary of her current daily living 
activities. (Id.). It then goes on to provide an assessment of 
Zirnsak’s current mental status—as of April 6, 2010. (Id. at 
885). In short, the report never explicitly addresses Zirnsak’s 
condition during the period from May 11, 2006 through 
December 31, 2007. Accordingly, the report has little, if any, 
relevance to whether Zirnsak was disabled during that time. 
For that reason, the ALJ did not err in giving the report little 
weight.  
 
3.  The Hypothetical Question Posed to the   
  Vocational Expert 
 
 Zirnsak next argues that the ALJ’s decision is not 
supported by substantial evidence because the hypothetical 
question posed to the vocational expert (hereinafter “VE”) 
was deficient for failure to fully reflect Zirnsak’s limitations. 
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(Appellant’s Br. at 49). Specifically, Zirnsak argues that the 
hypothetical should have addressed her short-term memory 
impairment and her “task problems” impairment. (Id. at 50). 
“Testimony of vocational experts in disability determination 
proceedings typically includes, and often centers upon, one or 
more hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ to the 
vocational expert.” Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 
(3d Cir. 1984). Usually, the ALJ will ask whether a 
hypothetical claimant with the same physical and mental 
impairments as the claimant can perform certain jobs that 
exist in the national economy. Id. The hypothetical must 
“accurately portray” any impairments of the claimant. 
Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554. This Court has held that to 
accurately portray a claimant’s impairments, the ALJ must 
include all “credibly established limitations” in the 
hypothetical. Id. (citing Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 431 
(3d Cir. 1999)). 
 
 Our decision in Rutherford v. Barnhart explains the 
framework employed by this Circuit to determine whether a 
limitation is credibly established. 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 
2005). First, limitations that are supported by medical 
evidence and are “otherwise uncontroverted in the record” 
must be included in the ALJ’s hypothetical for us to rely on 
the VE’s response to that hypothetical. Id. However, where a 
limitation is supported by medical evidence, but is opposed 
by other evidence in the record, the ALJ has discretion to 
choose whether to include that limitation in the hypothetical. 
Id. This discretion is not unfettered—the ALJ cannot reject 
evidence of a limitation for an unsupported reason. Id. 
Finally, the ALJ also has the discretion to include a limitation 
that is not supported by any medical evidence if the ALJ finds 
the impairment otherwise credible. Id.  
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 Zirnsak’s assertions that she suffered from short-term 
memory and task problem impairments fall into the second 
category of the framework explained in Rutherford: they are 
supported by medical evidence, but that evidence is 
controverted by other evidence in the record. Rutherford, 399 
F.3d at 554. Two medical examinations support Zirnsak’s 
contention that she suffered from both impairments during the 
relevant period. Doctor Franz’s July 14, 2006 medical 
examination of Zirnsak noted a short-term memory problem. 
(Tr. at 826–27). His July 20, 2007 medical examination of 
Zirnsak similarly noted short-term memory and task 
problems. (Id. at 830–31). 
  
 However, this medical evidence is disputed by other 
evidence in the record. First, Zirnsak’s responses to an 
“Activities of Daily Living” questionnaire contradict the 
notion that she had short-term memory or task problems. (Tr. 
at 167–78). One section of the questionnaire addresses 
“problems you [the claimant] might have thinking or 
concentrating.” (Id. at 171–73). In that section, Zirnsak noted 
that she did not require special help to take care of her 
personal needs. (Id. at 171). She also responded that she did 
not have any problems going out in public or getting along 
with family, friends, or neighbors. (Id. at 172). She further 
stated that she was able to “start and complete projects or 
activities such as reading a book, putting a puzzle together, 
sewing/needlepoint, fixing things around the house, etc.” 
(Id.). She also responded that she did not have trouble 
understanding instructions and carrying them out. (Id. at 173). 
However, Zirnsak’s testimony at the hearing before the ALJ 
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contradicts her own questionnaire responses. 4  Second, 
Zirnsak testified during her hearing that she regained her 
driver’s license in May of 2007. (Id. at 36).5 She testified that 
while she usually drove with her husband, she was only able 
to drive herself short distances alone during the relevant 
period. (Id. at 37). 
 
 This Circuit does “not require an ALJ to submit to the 
[VE] every impairment alleged by a claimant.” Rutherford, 
399 F.3d at 554. Rather, the ALJ is only required to submit 
credibly established limitations. Id. Where, as here, a 
limitation is supported by some medical evidence but 
controverted by other evidence in the record, it is within the 
ALJ’s discretion whether to submit the limitation to the VE. 
Id. While the record in this case is not conclusive as to 
whether Zirnsak had short-term memory or task problem 
limitations, there is substantial evidence to support a finding 
that she did not—namely, her lack of demonstrated problems 
with activities of daily living and her ability to drive. The 
ALJ therefore appropriately exercised his discretion when 
determining which limitations to submit to the VE. In making 
credibility determinations like this one, this Court will “not 
substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Id. at 
552. Accordingly, we find that the hypothetical question 
                                              
4 When asked at the hearing about her thinking ability 
during the relevant period, Zirnsak responded, “I don’t 
remember a lot.” (Tr. at 43). She testified that she was unable 
to pay attention for a full thirty-minute sitcom episode and 
that she struggled with addition and balancing a checkbook. 
(Id. at 46–47). 
5 Zirnsak temporarily lost her driver’s license after her 
seizure. 
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posed to the VE was not deficient for failure to fully reflect 
Zirnsak’s limitations. 
4. Conflict Between VE Testimony and Dictionary  
  of Occupational Titles 
 
 Zirnsak’s final argument is that the ALJ’s failure to 
resolve conflicts between the VE’s testimony and the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) warrants remand 
of her case. (Appellant’s Br. at 51). In step five of the 
disability inquiry, the Commissioner bears the burden of 
establishing the existence of jobs in the national economy that 
an individual with the claimant’s impairments is capable of 
performing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), § 404.1560 
(2014); Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987). 
To determine what type of work (if any) a particular claimant 
is capable of performing, the Commissioner uses a variety of 
sources of information, including the DOT, the SSA’s own 
regulatory policies and definitions (found in the Code of 
Federal Regulations (“CFR”)), and testimony from VEs. 
 
 “The DOT is a vocational dictionary that lists and 
defines all jobs available in the national economy and 
specifies what qualifications are needed to perform each job.” 
McHerrin v. Astrue, No. Civil Action No. 09–2035, 2010 WL 
3516433, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2010) (citing SSR 00-4p, 
2000 WL 1898704 (Dec. 4, 2000)). The qualification 
categories listed by the DOT for each job include the job’s 
Strength level, General Educational Development (“GED”) 
level, and its Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) level. 
Appendix C, Dictionary of Occupational Titles, available at 
www.occupationalinfo.org/ appendxc_1.html. Strength level 
“reflects the estimated overall strength requirement of the 
job.” Id. GED measures the “those aspects of education 
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(formal and informal) which are required of the worker for 
satisfactory job performance.” Id. GED is broken into three 
categories: (1) reasoning development, (2) mathematical 
development, and (3) language development. Id. Reasoning 
levels in the DOT range from level 1 to level 6. Id. Important 
to this case, jobs with a reasoning level of 3 require that an 
employee be able to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to 
carry out instructions furnished in written, oral, or 
diagrammatic form [and d]eal with problems involving 
several concrete variables in or from standardized situations.” 
Id.  
 
 SVP levels, on the other hand, measure the skill level 
necessary to perform a particular job. SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 
1898704, at *3 (Dec. 4, 2000). “A skill is knowledge of a 
work activity that requires the exercise of significant 
judgment that goes beyond the carrying out of simple job 
duties.” Id. SVP levels in the DOT range from level 1 to level 
9. Id. The DOT skill levels correspond with the second source 
of information relied on by the Commissioner: the CFR. 
Section 404.1568 of the CFR classifies occupations into three 
categories: unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled. 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1568(a)–(c) (2014). Unskilled work is defined as “work 
which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can 
be learned on the job in a short period of time.” Id. § 
404.1568(a). Unskilled work corresponds to an SVP level of 
1–2; semi-skilled work corresponds to an SVP level of 3–4; 
and skilled work corresponds to an SVP level of 5–9. SSR 
00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *3 (Dec. 4, 2000). 
 
 The Commissioner can also rely on testimony from a 
VE to meet its step-five evidentiary burden. 20 C.F.R. § 
404.1566(e). VEs are most commonly used to provide 
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evidence at hearings before ALJs to resolve complex 
vocational issues. SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *3 (Dec. 
4, 2000). However, a common issue—and the one argued by 
Zirnsak on appeal—arises when a VE’s testimony conflicts 
with other sources of information relied on by the 
Commissioner, namely the DOT. As a general rule, 
occupational evidence provided by a VE should be consistent 
with the occupational evidence presented in the DOT. Id. at 
*2. To ensure consistency, courts have imposed an obligation 
on ALJs to “[i]dentify and obtain a reasonable explanation for 
any conflicts between occupational evidence provided by VEs 
. . . and information in the [DOT].” Id. at *1; Rutherford, 399 
F.3d at 556. Specifically, an ALJ is required to (1) ask, on the 
record, whether the VE’s testimony is consistent with the 
DOT, (2) “elicit a reasonable explanation” where an 
inconsistency does appear, and (3) explain in its decision 
“how the conflict was resolved.” Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 
113, 127 (3d Cir. 2002). An ALJ’s failure to comply with 
these requirements may warrant remand in a particular case. 
Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 557. However, this Circuit has 
emphasized that the presence of inconsistencies does not 
mandate remand, so long as “substantial evidence exists in 
other portions of the record that can form an appropriate basis 
to support the result.” Id. (citing Boone v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 
203, 209 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
  
 Zirnsak alleges that the VE’s testimony at her hearing 
conflicted with the DOT in two ways. The first inconsistency 
involves the VE’s testimony that Zirnsak was capable of 
working as an order clerk, charge account clerk, or telephone 
quotation clerk. Zirnsak argues that the reasoning level 
required for these three jobs—all three occupations have a 
GED reasoning level of 3—is inconsistent with the ALJ’s 
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finding that Zirnsak is “limited to simple and repetitive tasks 
involving routine work processes and settings.” (Appellant’s 
Br. at 51–52). The second inconsistency involves the VE’s 
testimony that Zirnsak was capable of working as a sedentary 
subassembler with a sit/stand option. Zirnsak argues that the 
strength requirements for a subassembler conflict with the 
ALJ’s finding that Zirnsak should be limited to sedentary 
work. (Id. at 54–56). For the following reasons, we find that 
neither of these inconsistencies warrants remand. 
   
  A. Reasoning Level Conflict  
  
 As a threshold matter, we must first note that the ALJ 
met his affirmative obligation to inquire about inconsistencies 
in this case. At the end of the VE’s testimony, the ALJ 
specifically asked: “Is the testimony that you did provide 
consistent with the information I’d find in the [DOT] and 
other relevant vocational sources?” (Tr. at 59). The VE 
responded that her testimony was consistent except for the 
fact that the DOT does not address a sit/stand option for 
subassembler positions. (Id.). The VE did not note the 
inconsistencies in strength or reasoning level now argued by 
Zirnsak on appeal. Importantly, neither Zirnsak nor her 
attorney “challenged the VE on th[ese] point[s] or otherwise 
identified any apparent inconsistency between the VE’s 
testimony and the DOT.” Clawson v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 
11–294, 2013 WL 154206, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2013).  
 
 Because the VE did not identify the reasoning level 
inconsistency at the hearing, the ALJ did not elicit an 
explanation for that inconsistency or explain in its decision 
how the conflict was resolved. Burns, 312 F.3d at 127. 
Therefore, we must determine whether there is substantial 
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evidence in the record that still supports the ALJ’s 
determination. Boone, 353 F.3d at 209. There is a split of 
authority as to whether an inherent conflict exists between a 
job requiring level 3 reasoning and a finding that a claimant 
should be limited to simple, routine tasks and unskilled work. 
Several courts have held that a finding limiting a claimant to 
simple, repetitive tasks is inconsistent with a job requiring a 
reasoning level of 3. E.g., Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 
1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005); McHerrin, 2010 WL 3516433, 
at *5. These courts have found that claimants limited to 
simple, repetitive tasks are better suited for jobs that require 
level 2 reasoning. E.g., Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1176. Further, 
they have held that an SVP classification of a job as unskilled 
does not neutralize the conflict between a limitation to simple 
tasks and a job requiring level 3 reasoning. McHerrin, 2010 
WL 2516433, at *6 (citing Lucy v. Chater, 113 F.3d 905, 909 
(8th Cir. 1997)).  
 
 On the other hand, several courts have found that there 
is not a “per se conflict between a reasoning level 3 job and 
[a] limitation to simple, routine tasks/unskilled work.” E.g., 
Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2009); Renfrow v. 
Astrue, 496 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007); Clawson v. Astrue, 
Civil Action No. 11–294, 2013 WL 154206, at *6 (W.D. Pa. 
Jan. 15, 2013); Simpson v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 10–2874, 
2011 WL 1883124, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2011). These 
courts have focused on whether a failure to inquire about or 
reconcile a conflict caused any harm to the claimant when 
determining whether remand is necessary. Simpson, 2011 WL 
1883124, at *5. These courts have found that any error 
stemming from an ALJ’s failure to ask about a conflict was 
harmless where the record established that the claimant in 
question could perform a level 3 reasoning job, despite a 
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limitation to simple work. Terry, 580 F.3d at 478; Renfrow, 
496 F.3d at 921; Simpson, 2011 WL 1883124, at *7. These 
courts have identified certain factors that influenced their 
reasoning. First, in Terry, the Seventh Circuit noted that the 
claimant in that case “[did] not argue that she [could not] 
perform these skills, perhaps because the record suggest[ed] 
she [could].” Terry, 580 F.3d at 478. Next, it emphasized that 
because the claimant did not point out the conflict at trial, she 
was required to show that the conflict was “obvious enough 
that the ALJ should have picked up on [it] without any 
assistance.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Overman v. 
Astrue, 546 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2008)). Finally, these 
courts noted that the jobs listed by the VE were only 
representative examples—not an exhaustive list—of jobs that 
the claimant was capable of performing. Simpson, 2011 WL 
1883124, at *8 (citing Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 557). 
 
 The review of the aforementioned cases demonstrates 
that there is no bright-line rule stating whether there is a per 
se conflict between a job that requires level 3 reasoning and a 
finding that a claimant should be limited to simple and 
routine work. Without controlling precedent on this issue, this 
Court finds that the decisions in the Terry and Simpson cases 
are most applicable to the facts of Zirnsak’s case. First, as in 
Terry and Simpson, Zirnsak does not seriously argue that she 
is incapable of performing the jobs—order clerk, charge 
account clerk, or telephone quotation clerk—recommended 
by the VE.6 The record establishes that Zirnsak could perform 
                                              
6 Instead, she dedicates only one line of her brief to 
this issue, stating that: “The record does not indicate any 
explanation as to how a hypothetical claimant limited to only 
simple, repetitive, routine work could perform the 
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these jobs. Zirnsak completed tenth grade and testified that 
she received her GED or further education. (Tr. at 33). 
Zirnsak also had previous experience working as both a clerk 
and a bookkeeper. (Id. at 34). Further, the “objective medical 
record [was deemed] unsupportive of the claimant’s 
allegations of disabling mental impairments.” (Id. at 18). At 
numerous evaluations during the relevant period, Zirnsak was 
noted to be “oriented,” “calm,” and “psychologically 
appropriate.” (Id.). She received only conservative 
treatment—primarily medication—during the relevant period. 
(Id. at 19). Finally, Zirnsak’s own account of her daily 
activities was “relatively full and independent.” (Id.). 
 
 Second, as in Terry and Simpson, Zirnsak’s counsel 
did not identify any inconsistencies between the VE’s 
testimony and the DOT at her hearing. (Tr. at 59). In fact, 
Zirnsak’s counsel did not question the VE regarding 
inconsistencies at all. (Id.). Finally, as in Simpson, the 
occupations listed by the VE were only “a couple examples” 
of jobs available to Zirnsak. (Id. at 57); Simpson, 2011 WL 
1883124, at *8 (citing Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 557). 
Accordingly, the combination of these factors compels our 
finding that “any conflict [was] not so obvious that the ALJ 
should have pursued the question.” Simpson, 2011 WL 
1883124, at *7 (alteration in original) (quoting Terry, 580 
F.3d at 476). 
 
                                                                                                     
occupations of order clerk, charge account clerk, and 
telephone quote clerk, as described by the DOT.” 
(Appellant’s Br. at 53–54). 
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 B. Strength Level Conflict 
Zirnsak also argues that the strength requirements for a 
subassembler conflict with the ALJ’s finding that Zirnsak 
should be limited to sedentary work. The SSA and DOT both 
assign “physical exertion requirements” to each job available 
in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (2014) 
(“To determine the physical exertion requirements of work in 
the national economy, we classify jobs as sedentary, light, 
medium, heavy, and very heavy. These terms have the same 
meaning as they have in the [DOT].”). Sedentary work 
requires the lowest level of physical exertion. Id. The ALJ 
found that Zirnsak was only capable of performing sedentary 
work. (See Tr. at 16 (“After careful consideration of the entire 
record, I find that . . . the claimant had the [RFC] to perform 
sedentary work . . . except she would have been limited to 
sedentary work that did not require the operation of foot 
controls or the operation of dangerous machinery.”)). At 
Zirnsak’s hearing, the VE testified that Zirnsak could work as 
a subassembler. (Id. at 57–58). The VE characterized this job 
as “sedentary.” (Id. at 57). However, the DOT has assigned 
the job of subassembler a physical exertion level of “light.” 
Thus, there is an inconsistency between the VE’s and the 
DOT’s characterization of the physical exertion level required 
for subassembler positions. This inconsistency was identified 
at the hearing. (Id. at 59). 
 
Therefore, our inquiry focuses on whether the ALJ (1) 
“elicit[ed] a reasonable explanation” for this inconsistency 
and (2) explained in his decision “how the conflict was 
resolved.” Burns, 312 F.3d at 127. Here, the VE did provide 
an explanation for the inconsistency. She noted that the 
subassembler job could be performed with a sit/stand option. 
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(Tr. at 58). However, she noted that the DOT does not discuss 
or address this option. (Id. at 59). She explained that she was 
aware of subassembler jobs with a sit/stand option from her 
“work in the field.” (Id.). The ALJ relied on this explanation 
to resolve the conflict. (Id. at 21). However, neither the ALJ 
nor the VE explained how a sit/stand option would transform 
a subassembler job from a job requiring “light” exertion level 
to a “sedentary” job. Thus, we cannot say that the ALJ 
elicited a reasonable explanation for this inconsistency or 
resolved this conflict. However, the ALJ’s failure to comply 
with the requirements of SSR 00-4p in this instance is not 
fatal. Substantial evidence supports Zirnsak’s ability to 
perform three other jobs widely available in the national 
economy: order clerk, food and beverage (35,000 jobs 
nationally); charge account clerk (40,000 jobs nationally); 
and telephone clerk (80,000 jobs nationally). (Tr. at 57). 
Therefore, the erroneous inclusion of the subassembler 
position as an example of a job available to Zirnsak did not 
cause her any harm. Accordingly, we find that the existence 
of these minor conflicts does not warrant remand of the ALJ’s 
decision. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
